[Mageia-dev] Will this work for a build system?
bgmilne at multilinks.com
Mon Sep 27 12:31:18 CEST 2010
On Monday, 27 September 2010 10:51:19 Giuseppe Ghibò wrote:
> 2010/9/27 Michael Scherer <misc at zarb.org>
> > Le lundi 27 septembre 2010 à 03:19 +0200, vfmBOFH a écrit :
> > > What about virtualization?
> > >
> > > Maybe we could set-up some kind of cluster of remote and dedicated
> > > vm's as a
> > > unique build system.
Are you familiar with how the Mandriva build cluster worked? If not, you
should try and familiarise yourself with it first. While there are areas for
improvement, most of the time it worked very effectively.
> > > Could be a good workaround over security and
> > > integrity issues, 'cause we are using a "single" build system.
You need to explain further how "remote" VMs can be used to workaround
security issues ...
> > Well, how do you garantee that the person who have physical access do
> > not mess with the vm image ?
Again, as I said earlier, you need to be able to maintain the entire integrity
of the build environment/tool chain, not just the source of software being
compiled (to avoid trojaned compiler, possibly injected by trojan hypervisor
> > Look at libvirt developers blog ( http://rwmj.wordpress.com/ ) to see
> > how easy it can be to externally mess with a virtual instance if you are
> > root on the host computer.
> The only way of doing this is NOT letting anyone packaging or uploading a
This is not the only requirement.
> Just have two different building system. One "secure" and the
> other of contributors (not unsecure, but with less checking). The secure
> one would download the tarball automatically from the original
> e.g.: suppose there is a package SPEC file containing:
> Source: http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5-1.tar.xz
> Source1: http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5.1.tar.sig
> An automatic system would try to retrieve from the http://blabla.com/ site
> the packages
> http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5-1.tar.xz, or if not exists
> http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5-1.tar.bz2 or
> http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5-1.tar.gz or
> http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5-1.tar. Then would retrieve the signature
> http://blabla.com/openssh-5.5.1.tar.sig and would check with the one from
> the Database of signatures which has been already populated on the secure
> system. If the signatures checking would match, then tarball would be
> uploaded to the "secure" system svn and used for building instead of the
> one from the contributor/package maintainer.
> [Of course the system would fail if the package maintainer has downloaded
> the source tarball from the svn and not from a canonical repository, and to
> be further secure this system would require also signing of Patches].
IMHO, you should also keep the public keys of tarball signers. Please have a
look at the samba SPEC file, which does verification of the tarball signature
during %prep. In conjunction with the existing build tools (repsys/mdvsys
etc.), a single command ('mdvsys update samba xxx') currently (usually)
updates and submits the package, and building it at any time validates the
Actually, I still need to petition other security-sensitive packages which
have previously said that tarball signing is irrelevant (due to the problem of
first establishing trust of public keys etc.).
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