[Mageia-dev] PGP keys and package signing
boklm at mars-attacks.org
Mon Jan 31 20:12:24 CET 2011
On Mon, 31 Jan 2011, Michael Scherer wrote:
> Le lundi 31 janvier 2011 à 18:26 +0100, nicolas vigier a écrit :
> > On Mon, 31 Jan 2011, Michael Scherer wrote:
> > > We can 1) have a long enough expiration date ( but EOL + 1y seems quite
> > > enough IMHO )
> > > 2) push unexpired keys before it is too late if needed ( I routinely
> > > push my key after extending the expiration date ).
> > Pushing new unexpired keys also means we need to resign all old packages
> > if we want them to be installable. So that's not something we want to do
> > too often if it's not needed.
> Nope, I didn't say "new unexpired key", but just push the same key, with
> the expiration date extended. That should be painless IIRC ( at least,
> it is for me ).
Oh, I misunderstood this as I imagined it was not possible to change
expiration date on a key as it would be difficult to check if the change
was done before expiration. But after checking, it is indeed possible,
and it is even possible to do it after the expiration date.
So we can do it, but we should remember that it does not protect against
a key compromised after it has expired (as someone stealing the key
can change the expiration date even after it has expired).
So the only use of expiration date I see is to check that the key was
updated from keyserver recently. Maybe we can set a short expiration
time (15 days ?), and have something in cron to update it a few days
before it expire ?
> > > > - I don't think using expiration date reduce the damage of a leaked
> > > > key. If the key is leaked, we revoke it (or its signature) immediatly
> > > > on all key servers, which should be faster than waiting for the key to
> > > > expire. And replacing an expired key is not more simple than replacing
> > > > a revoked key.
> > >
> > > The problem is not leaking the key, it is about cryptographic attacks
> > > about older keys.
> > >
> > > If in 10 years, there is some technology that allows people to get our
> > > private key by bruteforce on the public one, if it is expired, attackers
> > > will not be able to use it even if they have it. Since the plan is to
> > > say "every key signed is valid", then we are potentially screwed if a
> > > old key is compromised offline.
> > If in 10 years there is some technology to get our private key, then
> > it's still possible to revoke the key at that time.
> > Instead of deciding
> > now that the key will expire in a few years, I would prefer that we look
> > at it in a few years to decide if we want to revoke it.
> Wouldn't it be too late ?
Considering that it is possible to update expiration date even after it
has expired, this expiration date doesn't protect against some technology
that would allow people in the futur to bruteforce the private key.
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