[Mageia-discuss] A possible risk ?

[Michael Scherer]

Le mercredi 08 février 2012 à 14:02 +0100, Wolfgang Bornath a écrit :
> 2012/2/8 Michael Scherer <misc at zarb.org>:
> > Le mercredi 08 février 2012 à 08:47 -0300, Renaud (Ron) Olgiati a
> > écrit :
> >> On Wednesday 08 Feb 2012 08:37 my mailbox was graced by a message from Claire
> >> Robinson who wrote:
> >> > > I ended up installing Mageia 1 on his box, but I wonder why does the
> >> > > distribution allow the user to potentially hose his system, when it
> >> > > requires the root password to install a prog ?
> >> > > Would it not make more sense to ask for the root password for the updates?
> >>
> >> > It is configurable in MCC. You can find it under Security => Configure
> >> > authentication for Mageia Tools.
> >> > Just select root for Update.
> >>
> >> Brilliant, thanks.
> >>
> >> But would it not make more sense to have the default changed to root ?
> >
> > That totally miss the point, which is that a upgrade hosed the system.
> > Would requiring the root password have changed that ? I doubt.
> 
> No. What you are pointing at (the breakage of the system) is a matter
> to be looked at.

In fact, the breakage is not our call, since this is on Mandriva.

Read again : "I just had a call for help from a friend who used the
Sytem Update applet to update his Mandriva 2010.2 install and ended up
with an un-usable machine, KDE 
crashing when opening a session."

So basically, a mandriva update applied on a mandriva system did go
wrong, without explaining why or what caused issues ( could have been
various stuff, from bad packages or updates breakage, and given the lack
of evidence and information, we cannot conclude much, except this is not
our problem at all since this is on Mandriva ).

> But the point you are missing is the security breakage.  If a user
> does not have the root password then there is a reason for that and he
> is probably working in an environment where only dedicated people have
> the permission to do system management and it is their task to do
> updates. 

Then in such environment, the sysadmin will set it so only him can do
update. If there is a admin, we should assume that he know what to do,
and restrict it accordingly, using the tools as explained by Claire.

> A private user who is on his own usually has the root
> password. So your point of missing security updates because of 2
> passwords is not valid.

What part of "having to keep 2 password is more complex than having one"
is wrong ? I have seen lots of people even asking to remove all
passwords since they do not care, so having 2 just worst.


-- 
Michael Scherer